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FRANS J.J. VAN HEEMSTRA

Sovereign Immunity and
Judicial Remedies Against
The Netherlands Government
I. In the Netherlands the Judiciary Has Exclusive
Jurisdiction Over All Conflicts Relating to
Property and Property Rights Involving Sovereign
States, Including The State of the Netherlands
The power of the courts with respect to conflicts involving rights and obligations of sovereign states is based on the Constitution of the Netherlands, Article
167, and the Law on the Judiciary, Article 2, both providing in substance that
the consideration and decision of all conflicts relating to property or rights
flowing therefrom are exclusively within the power of the judiciary. The law
containing general provisions of legislation of the Kingdom, Article 13-A [LAW
AB], provides that the power of the courts and the execution of judgments and
authentic deeds is limited by the exceptions recognized by international law.
Accordingly, the "reglament" for marshals provides in Article 13-4 that a
marshal must refuse to serve a summons or other legal notice if he has been
advised by or on behalf of the Minister of Justice that the service of such notice
would violate the obligations of the State of the Netherlands under international
law. Similar provisions of law are in force in other parts of the Kingdom, to wit,
the Netherlands Antilles and Surinam. During the deliberations in Parliament
of the above-mentioned Article 13-A it was emphasized that the purpose of the
statute was to enact the principle of international law that a foreign state is not
subject to the jurisdiction of other states with regard to the exercise of its
independent sovereign power, whether lawful or not.
Under the jurisprudence developed by the courts pursuant to this provision,
the courts have gradually recognized that there is no rule of international law
granting immunity to a sovereign who participates in commercial and other
transactions and activities on the same basis as a private person. Since, under
the laws referred to above, the courts are exclusively empowered to deal with
conflicts involving property rights including property rights of sovereigns, a
court will make its own determination whether a party is a sovereign state,
independent of the question whether the state is recognized by the Netherlands
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or not. The court is not bound by any official attitude of the Department of
Foreign Affairs or any advice it might give.
The following cases illustrate the trend of decisions in the Netherlands with
regard to the question of sovereign immunity.
Decisions Concerned with the Question Whether for
Acts Done Jure Gestionis and Not Jure Imperii
the State Could Claim Sovereign Immunity
Although decisions by Netherlands courts in similar situations do not have
the authority they have in the Anglo-American system, they do show what the
prevailing view in the Netherlands is on this point. The interpretation of international law by the courts of the Netherlands Antilles and Surinam would be
substantially the same as in the Netherlands.
In one case the government of the Union of South Africa sued to vacate an
attachment levied against a ship owned by it. The ship contained a cargo of
cement purchased by the Union Government. The cargo had been attached by a
private individual as security for costs this individual had incurred on behalf of
the Union Government. Adverting to the principle laid down in Article 13-A
[LAW AB] referred to above, the court held that international law limited the
exception of sovereign immunity to acts done jure imperii. The court further
found the state here had incurred liability acting as a private person and that it
was subject to the foreign (in casu, Netherlands') court.1
The Garbi2
In this case a Spanish national, owner of the vessel "The Garbi," obtained
permission to seize the ship claimed by him as his property, which was
nationalized by the Spanish Republican government when it was passing
through Dutch territorial waters on its way from Antwerp to the North Sea. The
Spanish republic was a sovereign state recognized by the Netherlands and
maintaining diplomatic relations with the Netherlands. Upon consideration of
the plea of immunity by the Spanish government, the President of the Court,
who had given the earlier permission to attach the ship, vacated the attachment.
He reasoned that there are different opinions as to the extent of the immunity
from jurisdiction, that immunity was sometimes limited to purely governmental
activities and did not extend to private commerce carried on by the state. The
president held, however, that this distinction was not relevant in the case before
him because it did not raise a question of liability resulting from the operation
of the ship but a matter of ownership thereof, and in connection with claims of
ownership the sovereign immunity doctrine remains in full force and effect.
'Amsterdam District Court, Netherlands' Jurisprudence (N.J.), 1921, page 849.
'President, District Court Middelburg N.J. 1939 No. 96, Ann. Dig. Suppl. Vol. 155.
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In Froe v. U.S.S.R. 3 the court declared itself incompetent, upholding the
immunity of the Soviet Union in a claim for nonpayment on Russian bonds. The
court recognized that this claim involved state loans raised by public subscription and did not involve acts done jure gestionis.
In Weber v. U.S.S.R.' the court held on appeal that it had no jurisdiction.
The court considered that recognition and respect of the sovereignty of a state
did not permit the exercise of jurisdiction over that state by a foreign court. For
this reason, the distinction between acts jure imperii and jure gestionis was
irrelevant and was also impracticable because opinions differed widely on the
purposes and limits of state interference with economic life. It followed that the
question at issue was not, What is the judicial character of certain acts? but in
what capacity does the state act when a claim is brought against it. A foreign
state will always claim that it acts in its capacity as public authority and a court
should not pass opinion on whether the state's attitude is correct or not.
Note: It is significant that this judgment in favor of sovereign immunity of the Soviet
government agency was given by the Dutch Court at the time of occupation of Holland
by the German forces.
Nederlandsche Rynbank, Amsterdam v. Muehlig Union
Glasindustryof Teplitz Schoenau, Czechoslovakia'
This case involved the sale to defendant company of shares in a Czechoslovak
company originally owned by Rynbank, a Jewish bank, and declared Jewish
property during the German occupation. The Council for Restoration of Legal
Rights asked that the transaction be annulled under Netherlands Emergency
Decree No. ElOO. Defendant claimed sovereign immunity on the basis that it
had been nationalized by the Czechoslovak government. The court denied the
claim for sovereign immunity because the rule of sovereign immunity of states
did not apply where a state conducted activities in the commercial, industrial or
financial fields.
6

Poortensdijk v. Soviet Republic of Latvia
A claim for compensation for nationalized property against the Republic of
Latvia was dismissed on the basis of sovereign immunity. The court found that
the acts performed were jure imperii.
In Exportchleb v. Goudeket7 sovereign status was claimed for the commercial

'District Court of Amsterdam, confirmed by Supreme Court N.J. 1933, 980, Ann. Dig. 19311932, 170.
'Amsterdam Court of Appeal N.J. 1942, No. 757, Ann. Dig. Suppl. Vol. 140.
'Council for Restoration of Legal Rights, Amsterdam 1947, N.O.R. 1947, No. 990, Ann. Dig.
1947, p. 77.
'Amsterdam District Court N.J. 1941, No. 338; confirmed Amsterdam Court of Appeal N.J.
1943. No. 340. Ann. Dig. Suppl. Vol. 142.
'District Court Amsterdam 1935, N.J., p. 1058, Ann. Dig. 1935-1937, 117.
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representation of the Soviet Union in Germany. In upholding the claim the
court ruled that non-recognition by the Netherlands government did not mean
that the de facto government of Russia could not appear in court as plaintiff.
Dutch courts upheld the claim of de facto sovereignty of the insurgent
Republic of the Moluccas (forming part of the Republic of Indonesia) even
though the Netherlands government had recognized the government of
Indonesia as the de jure government of the entire Indonesian archipelago.
Republik Moluku Selatan v. Kon. PaketvaartMy'
In a similar vein, the court rejected in the proposition that non-recognition by
the Netherlands government meant that a state may not de facto exist under
international law criteria. The court must determine this independently based
on the facts and circumstances.
The court found, inter alia, that "authority of the Moluccas government
over population and territory with respect to duration, character and substance
complies with the requirements of stability and effectiveness essential for a state
to exist. Even though it may be urged that, in the future, this authority might
not be able to maintain itself against the overwhelming force of the Republic of
Indonesia, there is no objection in this summary proceeding to recognition of
the government of the Moluccas as an independent state and to its admission as
persona stanti in judicio."9
Summary
In his article, "The Problem of Jurisdictional Immunity of Foreign States,"" °
the late judge Lauterpacht concluded that the balance of authority in the
Netherlands, insofar as judicial practice is concerned, is probably in favor of the
recognition of the distinction between acts jure imperii and jure gestionis and
of the denial of absolute immunity of foreign states.
Treaty oflBrussels. It should be mentioned that the Netherlands is a signatory
to the convention for the unification of certain rules relating to the immunity of
state-owned vessels, signed at Brussels April 10, 1926, and which became
effective January 8, 1937. (Government Gazette 936, No. 98.) This Treaty deals
with claims arising from the exploitation and transport of state-owned vessels,
but does not contain provisions regarding claims of their ownership. Under it
the contracting parties waive immunity in most cases where government ships
are engaged in commercial operations.

'President Amsterdam District Court N.J. 450, No. 804; appeal Amsterdam Court of Appeal,
N.J., 1951, No. 129.
'Accord: The Republic Moloku Selatan v. New Guinea, Court of Justice of New Guinea, N.J.
1953, No. 100.
°BRITISH YEARBOOK OF INTERNATIONAL LAW, 1951.
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H. Effect in the Netherlands of a Judgment Obtained In
the United States Against the Netherlands
Under Sec. 431 of the Netherlands Code of Civil Procedure, the judgment of a
foreign court can only be executed in the Netherlands in accordance with Secs.
985 ff, of the Netherlands Civil Code. Section 985 provides that such a judgment
may be executed in the Netherlands only under a treaty or pursuant to law and
requires then the approval of a court. In that event the matter will not again be
tried. The court within the jurisdiction of which the other party is located and
the court where the execution is demanded have jurisdiction. The decision is
subject to appeal to higher courts in accordance with the ordinary rules for
appeal.
There is presently no treaty between the Netherlands and the United States
providing for such enforcement of judgments of one state in the other state. The
Treaty of Friendship, of Commerce and Navigation between the United States
and the Netherlands signed March 27, 1956, contains no provisions such as are
referred to in Article 985.
It is therefore to be assumed that an action must be brought on the judgment
against the Netherlands government or its agency before the court having jurisdiction as stated above. There is jurisprudence to the effect that although the
American judgment could not be granted the authority of res adjudicata (Art.
1954 Civil Code), this would not prevent the court from giving the findings in
that judgment such evidentiary value as the court may deem justified based on
an examination of the record before it, and in this way obviate the need for
renewed hearings of witnesses for presentation of evidence. It has been held on
appeal 1 that a foreign judgment is always binding upon a party when the party,
before or after the judgment was rendered, expressly or by implication agreed to
subject itself to the jurisdiction of the foreign court. This may arise from the fact
that a party plaintiff voluntarily submitted to the foreign court, or that a party
defendant carried on his defense to the highest court in the foreign jurisdiction,
or in such other manner as would justify the inference that he submitted to the
jurisdiction. The court will also examine whether all facts and defenses had
been carefully examined by the foreign court, and whether the defendant had
been adequately assisted by legal counsel. In addition, the judgment should not
be contrary to the public policy of the Netherlands. Finally, no new facts should
be submitted by the defendant not previously considered by the foreign court.
The Court of Appeal of Amsterdam held that under principles of
international private law it would be against good faith and justice to allow
parties to be drawn into new litigation on the same facts before a Netherlands
court if the issue had already been litigated in three instances up to the highest
"Court

of Appeal Hertogen Bosch, N.J. 1952, No. 616.
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court in Germany. On this ground the court of first instance had held the
German judgment to be binding upon plaintiff. The court of appeal affirmed,
emphasizing that this did not mean that it recognized the German judgment as
res adjudicata."2A decision on similar grounds was reached by the court of first
instance of Rotterdam. 3
There is now consistent jurisprudence in the Netherlands to the effect that if a
sovereign state participates in commerce on an equal basis with private
individuals it should be bound and liable like private individuals. Since it must
be assumed that under the legislation under consideration in the United States a
judgment would only be rendered against the Netherlands in accordance with
the principles of the Tate Letter, (that is, when the sovereign state is liable for
an obligation resulting from a commercial transaction and had therefore acted
jure gestionis), the Netherlands court, after having made the required
findings, would in fact give full faith and credit to the American judgment. The
fact that the defendant would be the State of the Netherlands would not
influence these considerations, provided of course that the litigation involved a
commercial transaction.
There has also been developed in the Netherlands extensive jurisprudence
related to the liability of the State of the Netherlands for unlawful or negligent
acts giving cause for payment of compensation to the party damaged thereby by
the fault of the government. (Article 1401 Civil Code). Private obligations for
which an ordinary citizen is liable are in principle also binding on the government, independent of any obligations of written or unwritten law.
In areas where the government acts in its sovereign capacity, the task of the
government includes the obligation of inquiry and the making of decisions
within scope and purpose of its legal authority as a reasonable person would
accept. The government cannot act in excess of its power or arbitrarily, and
would therefore remain liable for damages. That the court has considerable
freedom to determine its own competence in matters involving actions against
the government for damages caused by its negligent or arbitrary acts has been
established by consistent jurisprudence of the Supreme Court of the Nether4
lands, and by legal writers.'
The Supreme Court has held that on the basis of the constitution and Article
2, Law on the Judiciary, a court is empowered to deal with' a claim for damages
against the government based on Article 1401 B.W. independent of the question
whether the claim is based on an unlawful act committed by the government in

"N.J. 1939, no. 23.
"N.J. 1948, no. 549.
"HOFFMANN-DRION,

GENERAL TREATISE ON OBLIGATIONS,

second part, 8th ed. (1959); pp.

205-213.
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the public or the private sphere. 5 The protection of Article 1401 is not
exhausted by the claim, for Hofmann concludes that the court may determine
its own competence and thereby determine the borderline between its power and
that of the government. "This is indeed the system of our (Netherlands) law." It
could have been different, and indeed Article 170, para. 2, of the Constitution
of the Netherlands provides since 1948 that "the law regulates the manner in
which conflicts of competence between the administrative and judicial power
shall be decided." However, such a law was never enacted. The Netherlands
legal system does not embody an administrative court which would deal
specifically with problems and liabilities resulting from the exercise of
governmental power such as the French Conseil d'Etat.
Within the recognized competence of the court to deal with unlawful or negligent acts of the government, a system of norms has been developed, under
which it seems clear that a foreign country judgment dealing with such a
question would be examined by a Netherlands court, and if its decision came
within the criteria under which a Netherlands court would hold the government
liable, it would be confirmed by the Netherlands judgment.
From the above it appears that the inconsistency signaled in the Tate Letter
that the United States government, while granting sovereign immunity to
foreign governments in the courts of the United States, submits itself to jurisdiction in these same courts in both contract and tort, is not encountered in the
Netherlands.
A recent case before the Supreme Court of the Netherlands 6 involved the
enforcement of an arbitration award rendered by arbitrators in Lausanne,
Canton de Vaud, Switzerland, against the State of Yugoslavia. The action in
arbitration and before the Netherlands court was brought by a French company
which had entered into a contract for the construction of a railroad owned and
managed by Yugoslavia. Confirmation of the award in the Netherlands was
sought under the United Nations convention on the recognition and
enforcement of foreign arbital awards of June 10, 1958. Switzerland and the
Netherlands had ratified the convention; Yugoslavia had not.
The Supreme Court rejected the argument of Yugoslavia that because it had
not ratified the convention it should as a sovereign not be brought against its
will before a foreign court, on the ground that Article 1 of the convention
requires only that the states where the award is made and where enforcement of
it is sought need to be parties. The court further held, reversing the court of
appeal, that it was irrelevant that the cantonal court of Vaud had held that the

"1H.R. 18.8 1944 N.J. 1944, 45, S. 98 Hoffmann, p. 210.
"Societe v. Yugoslavia: Weekly Law Decisions, Sept. 1973.
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award was not an award under the laws of Vaud, since the treaty in Article 1.2
merely requires "an award made by arbitrators appointed for each case" which
had happened here. Furthermore, under Article V. 1 execution of an award may
only be refused if it could not be subject to arbitration, or was violative of the
public order, in the country where enforcement is sought.
The court found:
That in the drafting practice of International treaties, legal literature, and the jurisprudence by national judges a tendency can be observed to limit the bases on which a
state can rely before a foreign court on sovereign immunity;
That this development has been influenced by the fact that in many countries the
state involves itself more and more in economic and commercial intercourse which is
governed by private law as a result of which such governments enter into legal relations
with individuals on an equal basis.
That in such cases it appears reasonable that the party contracting with such state
will have the same protection in law which it would have if it had contracted with a
private person:
That on these grounds it must be assumed that the immunity from jurisdiction to
which under modern international law a foreign state is entitled does not extend to
cases in which the state has acted as above described.

The decision further holds that no contacts for activities jure gestionis are
required within the territory of the Netherlands to bring the sovereign within the
jurisdiction of the Netherlands court. In this respect the Netherlands courts
apply a broader restriction to sovereign immunity than is contemplated under
the proposed legislation, excluding immunity only when the action against a
foreign government is "based upon a commercial activity carried on in the
United States." 17 Although the Yugoslavia case relates to enforcement of an
award, the language of the Supreme Court is broad, and applies to a rule of law
applicable to enforcement of any judgment or award against a sovereign state.
IH. Execution of Judgments against the Property of
a Sovereign State Including the Netherlands
The Court of Appeal of the Hague18 has held that, in an action against the
National Iranian Oil Company owned by the State of Iran, jurisdiction was
obtained over the company involving acta jure gestionis although the activities
had no connection with the Netherlands.
Plaintiff had as a provisional remedy attached properties of the defendant held
by four oil companies located in the Hague. It was argued that this was in
violation of international law, and the attachment should be vacated. The court
held that where it has been established that the court had jurisdiction, it would
7

" Sec. 1605(2) and draft of Proposed Para. (C)of Sec. 1603. Michael H. Cardozo, The Proposed
Legislation of the JurisdictionalImmunities of Foreign States,

INTERNATIONAL LAWYER, July

1974,

p. 442.
"Decision of November 28, 1968 (N.J. 1969, no. 484).
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follow that it could render judgment and "that a judgment by its nature can be
executed; and that if the sovereign did not prevent jurisdiction to grant a
judgment, neither can it prevent execution."
The Iranian Oil Company claimed that the "stated payments" of 121/2 percent
to the NIOC under the oil agreement of 1954 were due to the State of Iran as taxes
to the Imperial Treasury to be destined for the public services of the state, and
that therefore under international law rules, they could not be attached or be the
subject of execution of a judgment. The court found, however, that it had not
been shown that the moneys attached here were destined for the public service of
Iran, and that therefore execution against those funds was within the power of the
court.
Summary
Limitations on sovereign immunity are based on international law. The
Netherlands courts are independent in making any findings of law and fact and
rendering decisions in the matter including the fact of sovereignty de jure or de
facto; the rule of international law, the character of the transaction involvedthe foreign judgment to be executed.
There is no difference between the treatment of a foreign sovereign and the
Netherlands government. If the court finds the judgment of a foreign court to be
in accordance with principles of justice and of fair trial and international law, it
will enforce it by entering its own judgment based thereon.
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